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Abstract
We propose a novel discrete-time dynamical system-
based framework for achieving adversarial robust-
ness in machine learning models. Our algorithm
is originated from robust optimization, which aims
to find the saddle point of a min-max optimization
problem in the presence of uncertainties. The ro-
bust learning problem is formulated as a robust op-
timization problem, and we introduce a discrete-
time algorithm based on a saddle-point dynamical
system (SDS) to solve this problem. Under the as-
sumptions that the cost function is convex and un-
certainties enter concavely in the robust learning
problem, we analytically show that using a dimin-
ishing step-size, the stochastic version of our al-
gorithm, SSDS converges asymptotically to the ro-
bust optimal solution. The algorithm is deployed
for the training of adversarially robust deep neural
networks. Although such training involves highly
non-convex non-concave robust optimization prob-
lems, empirical results show that the algorithm can
achieve significant robustness for deep learning. We
compare the performance of our SSDS model to
other state-of-the-art robust models, e.g., trained us-
ing the projected gradient descent (PGD)-training
approach. From the empirical results, we find that
SSDS training is computationally inexpensive (com-
pared to PGD-training) while achieving comparable
performances. SSDS training also helps robust mod-
els to maintain a relatively high level of performance
for clean data as well as under black-box attacks.
Introduction
The success of adversarial perturbations to input
data for deep learning models poses a significant
challenge for the machine learning community. The
need becomes safety- and life-critical, considering
the application of deep learning based perception
system for self-driving cars or security applica-
tions5,25. While pure white-box attacks5,8,13,17,19,27
(where an adversary has full knowledge of the ma-
chine learning model) could be difficult to execute in
practice, researchers have shown strong transferabil-
ity of attacks21 that can still cause significant dam-
age.
As attacks became more and more powerful, several
defense strategies have also been proposed. A pop-
ular category of defense strategy is adversarial train-
ing, where adversarial examples are added to the
training set followed by training the network using
the augmented dataset13,27. However, such meth-
ods seem to be quite sensitive to adversarial budget
used for generating the adversarial examples as well
as other training hyper-parameters. A more power-
ful and stable defense mechanism stems from decou-
pling the min-max robust optimization problem18
related to robust learning using the Danskin’s the-
orem10. Here, the inner maximization refers to find-
ing the adversarial perturbation that would maxi-
mize the training loss. On the other hand, the outer
maximization deals with minimization of the train-
ing loss for the perturbed inputs. The decoupling
process leads to the class of algorithms where, at a
training epoch, one can find the worst-case attacks
concerning the current model. Then a model pa-
rameter update step is executed following the tradi-
tional training process using perturbed training set
with the worst-case attacks. However, finding the
worst-case perturbation for deep learning models is
quite non-trivial and cannot be guaranteed primar-
ily due to the highly non-convex nature of the cost
surface. Typically, powerful attacks such as fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM)13, Carlini-Wagner (CW)8
and projected gradient descent (PGD)18 are run in
order to find the worst-case perturbations at every
training epoch. However, it is observed empirically
that the attacks with higher computational budgets
seem to be more successful in approximating the
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worst-case perturbations, e.g., 20 step PGD is much
stronger than a single step PGD. Therefore, it is usu-
ally quite expensive computationally to find a robust
deep learning model. Besides, there still remains a
significant gap in the literature, in crafting theoret-
ically sound algorithms for robust learning. Apart
from a few studies, e.g., by Shaham et al. 23 that pro-
posed a framework to justify the performance of ad-
versarial training theoretically, this area has not been
explored sufficiently.
In this paper, we introduce a new algorithm for ad-
versarial training of Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
based on continuous and discrete-time saddle point
dynamical system introduced in11 for solving robust
optimization (RO) problem4. Specifically, we intro-
duce the stochastic variant of deterministic saddle-
point dynamical system (SDS) referred to as SSDS
for robust learning. The stochastic variant is use-
ful in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) setting, typ-
ical for training of DNN. The min-max optimization
problem that arises in adversarial training of DNN
is formulated as RO problem. The objective of the
proposed SSDS algorithm is to converge to the min-
max saddle point.
Unlike existing approaches, our proposed algorithm
does not decouple the minimization and maximiza-
tion problems involved in robust optimization. In-
stead, it attempts to solve both problems simultane-
ously by evolving both the model parameters and
the adversarial perturbations through the training
epochs. As we do not attempt to find the worst-case
perturbations at every training epoch, we save sig-
nificant computation overhead as compared to other
methods such as PGD-training18 and TRADES 32.
While there are recent efforts to mitigate the compu-
tational overhead by using random projections 29 in-
stead of finding the worst case attacks, our approach
is fundamentally different as we still try to solve the
coupled robust optimization problem while reduc-
ing the computations overhead. To this end, in ad-
dition to model parameters and the adversarial per-
turbations, we also evolve two Lagrangian multipli-
ers through the training epochs, one for the model
parameters and the other for the adversarial pertur-
bations. Under the assumptions of convex cost func-
tion and concave uncertainties, we analytically show
that using a diminishing step-size, our SSDS algo-
rithm converges asymptotically to the robust opti-
mal solution. We also present extensive experimen-
tal results using CIFAR-10 and comparison with the
state-of-the-art for validation.
Contributions: Specifically, our contributions are:
(i) A new saddle-point dynamical systems approach
to robust learning for finding a robust model and the
corresponding worst-case adversarial perturbations,
(ii) a new Stochastic Saddle-point Dynamical Sys-
tems (SSDS) algorithm appropriate for robust deep
learning, (iii) analysis of convergence for SSDS un-
der certain restrictive assumptions (iv) empirical re-
sults to show that the proposed approach is a com-
putationally inexpensive way to train robust models
for white- and black-box attacks as well as maintain
a relatively high level of performance for clean data.
Related Work
Due to space constraints and a large amount of re-
cent progress on adversarial machine learning, our
discussion of related work is necessarily incomplete.
Here, we attempt to discuss the most recent & rele-
vant literature. We divide the section as: (1) adver-
sarial attack/defense and (2) robust optimization.
Adversarial Attack and Defense: Initial evidence of
the vulnerability of deep classifiers to imperceptible
adversarial perturbations was shown by27. Around
the same time, Biggio et al. 5 showed that SVMs
could malfunction in security-sensitive applications
and proposed a regularization term in the classi-
fiers. In the deep learning community, Goodfel-
low et al. 13 and Kurakin et al. 17 proposed the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and its iterative
variants as powerful attack strategies to fool deep
learning models. While these methods mainly fo-
cused on white box attacks, Papernot et al. 21 in-
troduced the notion of black-box attacks where the
adversary does not have complete knowledge of the
learning model. Attacks can also be categorized into
test-time5 and train-time (also known as data poi-
soning) attacks16, and targeted and non-targeted at-
tacks2. In this paper, we only focus on test-time,
non-targeted attacks.
Several defense approaches have been proposed in
the literature, such as using denoising autoencoders-
based Deep Contractive Networks14, and defining a
network robustness metric3. However, as discussed
in the introduction, the most popular robust deep
learning methods involve some form of adversar-
ial training13,18,23,28. Defensive distillation20 is also
another method of defense which showed fascinat-
ing results. However, Carlini and Wagner8 could
break such a defense mechanism by proposing mul-
tiple adversarial loss functions. Athalye et al. 1
further analyzed various defense approaches and
demonstrated that most existing defenses could be
beaten by approximating gradients over defensively
2
trained models. In this paper, we only focus on de-
fense for perception models such as deep CNN.
Robust Optimization: Authors in23 show that ad-
versarial training of neural networks is, in fact, ro-
bustification of the network optimization that can
be exploited to increase the local stability of neu-
ral networks. Robust optimization has also been
used in9 to find an approximately optimal min-
max solution that optimizes for non-convex objec-
tives. This method is based on a reduction from ro-
bust optimization to stochastic optimization. Here
an α-approximate stochastic oracle is given, and α-
approximate robust optimization in a convexified
solution space is obtained. Nonetheless, ideas from
robust optimization (closely related to regulariza-
tion in machine learning26,30) for solving robust
learning problems has not been explored sufficiently.
Problem Formulation
We first state the robust learning problem from a ro-
bust optimization viewpoint to provide the frame-
work for solving robust deep learning problems
with the saddle-point dynamics approach.
Robust Learning as a Robust Optimization Problem
We consider a standard classification task un-
der a data distribution D over the dataset I =
{I(1), I(2), · · · , I(N)}, where, I(i) ∈ Rm with set of la-
bels, y. The loss function (e.g., cross-entropy loss)
is denoted by L(I, y, w) with w ∈ Rn as the model
parameters (decision variables). From a robust opti-
mization (RO) perspective11, robust learning can be
written as
RO :=min
w
E(I,y)∼D
[
max
u∈U
L(I + u, y, w)
]
, (1)
where, the loss function L is also a function of ad-
ditive perturbation or uncertainty u (constrained by
uncertainty set U ) to the input.
Following the standard practice in machine learn-
ing, we approximate the expected loss with empir-
ical loss for a finite number of i.i.d training samples,
I(i) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · ·N}. We consider u(i) as the corre-
sponding uncertainty for the data point I(i). Hence,
RO problem (1) can be written as
RO :=min
w
∑Ni=1 max
u(i)∈U (i)
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w) , (2)
The fundamental assumption in RO is that the un-
certainty variables reside within the uncertainty sets
U (i) := {u(i) ∈ Rm : h(i)(u(i)) ≤ 0}, i = 1, . . . , N ,
where the h(i) functions representing the uncer-
tainty sets are typically assumed to be convex func-
tions such as norm-bound budgets. The goal here is
to obtain model parameters, w, (e.g., weights, θ and
biases, b for neural networks) that work well for all
possible uncertainty parameter realizations within
the uncertainty sets.
We assume that the RO problem (1) has at least
one robust feasible solution. Further, we make the
following assumption for the functions in the RO
problem (1)11.
Assumption 1. L(I + u, y, w) is strictly convex in w
and each L(I(i) + u(i), y(i), w) is strictly concave in u(i).
Moreover, each h(i)(u(i)) is convex in u(i), and each U (i)
needs to be a compact (and convex) set for i = 1, . . . , N.
Moreover, norm of L and h(i) s and their subgradients are
bounded on compact sets.
Based on the epigraph form of an optimization prob-
lem7, we rewriteRO problem (1) as
RO :=min
w,t
t s.t ∑Ni=1 max
u(i)∈U (i)
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)− t ≤ 0, (3)
which is an equivalent, albeit more convenient form
for our framework, where t is being added to the
vector of model parameters as an auxiliary decision
variable. We define the saddle and KKT point of
the RO problem later and discuss their properties
briefly.
Defining a Lagrangian multiplier λ ≥ 0 and the vec-
tor of model parameters as x := (w, t), the optimiza-
tion problem (3) can be written as
min
x=(w,t)
max
λ≥0
{
t + λ
(
∑Ni=1 max
u(i)∈U (i)
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)− t)} .
Then the total Lagrangian for the RO problem can
be written as
L(x,λ, u, v) := t + λ
(
∑Ni=1
(
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)
− v(i) h(i)(u(i)))− t) . (4)
where v(i) s are the Lagrangian multipliers for the
lower level maximization problem. Derivation of
the Lagrangian function along with the definition
and properties of the saddle and KKT point of RO
problem can be found in the supplementary ma-
terial. Note that the proposed discrete framework
for training adversarial deep learning models stems
from the continuous-time dynamical system con-
cepts and tools (e.g., Lyapunov theory) for solving
robust optimization (RO)11. Typically, loss function
in an RO framework is considered to be a func-
tion of just the model parameters, not the uncer-
tainty. Therefore, we formulate the algorithm with
Lagrangian multipliers that ensure satisfaction of
the attack budget asymptotically without hard pro-
jections. This formulation also helps in analysis.
3
Saddle-Point Dynamical System Algorithm
Following the discussion in the previous section, we
now propose the algorithms for both deterministic
and stochastic saddle-point dynamical system. For
simplicity, we are going to call them ”SDS” for de-
terministic and ”SSDS” for stochastic case.
Deterministic Saddle-point Dynamical System (SDS) Al-
gorithm
Defining x = (w, t), the discrete-time saddle-point
dynamics method finds the saddle point of the La-
grangian function by the iterations
xk+1 = xk − αk
(
∂x tk
+ λk∂x ∑Ni=1 L(I(i) + u
(i)
k , y
(i) , wk)− ∂x tk
)
, (5)
λk+1 =
[
λk + αk
(
∑Ni=1
(
L(I(i) + u(i)k , y
(i) , wk)
− v(i) h(i)(u(i)))− tk)]
+
, (6)
u(i)k+1 = u
(i)
k + αk
(
∂
u(i)
L(I(i) + u(i)k , y
(i) , wk)
− v(i) ∂
u(i)
h(i)(u(i))
)
, (7)
v(i)k+1 = [v
(i)
k + αkλkh
(i)(u(i)k )]+ , i = 1, . . . , N . (8)
Noting the u(i) update, we observe that the above
saddle discrete dynamics for finding the robust opti-
mal solution ofRO problem differs from the primal-
dual dynamics for deterministic problems12. This is
because the vector field for the above algorithm is
not obtained by taking the total Lagrangian’s sub-
gradient. Defining a set-valued mapping including
subgradient functions of the Lagrangian function (4)
components as
T(z) :=
(
∂xL(z),−∂λL(z),−∂u(1)L(1)(x, u(1) , v(1)), . . . ,
−∂
u(N)
L(N)(x, u(N) , v(N)), ∂
v(1)
L(z), . . . , ∂
v(N)
L(z)) ,
and denoting L(i)(x, u(i), v(i)) := L(I(i) +
u(i), y(i), w) − v(i) h(i)(u(i)) for i = 1 . . . , N, the
adaptive diminishing step-size in the above algo-
rithm is defined as
αk =
γk
‖T(zk)‖2 , with γk > 0 , ∑
∞
k=1 γk = ∞ , ∑
∞
k=1 γ
2
k < ∞ . (9)
Following theorem is the main result for asymptotic
convergence of the discrete-time saddle point algo-
rithm with diminishing step-size. We show that al-
gorithm (5)-(8) converges to the KKT point (equiv-
alent to the saddle point as specified in the supple-
mentary material) ofRO problem.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1 and the additional as-
sumption that λ? > 0 where λ? is the saddle point of
the Lagrangian (4) for λ part, the saddle point dynamics
(5)-(8) converges asymptotically to the robust optimal so-
lution with the adaptive diminishing step-size satisfying
(9).
Remark 1. Although the stability is not shown in this
paper, we observe in practice that the dynamics without
λ in v-update (8) works for both active and inactive con-
straints (whether λ? is positive or zero) of the RO prob-
lem and converges to the KKT point. Therefore, we pro-
pose removing λ from v-update to use in practice for solv-
ing theRO problem.
Remark 2. Convergence results are also proved where
the adaptive step-size is replaced with constant step-size,
say α, in the algorithm (5)-(8). In particular, with a con-
stant step-size, convergence rate of o( 1k ) can be proved for
the Lagrangian function L in (4) as
L(x? ,λ? , u? , v?)− 1
k ∑
k
j=1 L(xj ,λj , uj , vj)| ≤ c1k + c0(α), (10)
where (x?,λ?, u?, v?) specifies the saddle point, c1 is
some constant, and limα→0 c0(α)→ 0.
Stochastic Saddle-point Dynamical System (SSDS) Al-
gorithm
The deterministic saddle point algorithm presented
above is modified to account for the stochastic effect
inherent in the implementation of optimization al-
gorithms (e.g., SGD) involving a large training set.
To reduce the computational burden of calculating
batch gradients for a large training set, typically the
gradient of loss function is computed for a randomly
selected data point (simple SGD) or a small batch
of data points (mini-batch SGD). Following similar
works in6 for a simple SGD setting, we define x :=
(t, w), f (x) := t, g(x, u, ξ) := L(Iξ + uξ , y, w) − t,
where ξ ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a random variable model-
ing the process for randomly selecting a data point
out of N possible samples. Furthermore, we define
g(x, u) = ∑Ni L(I
(i) + u(i), y(i), w) − t. With these
notations, the stochastic version of the deterministic
saddle point algorithm is written as follows:
xk+1 = xk − αk(∂x f (xk) + λk∂x g(xk , uk , ξk)) , (11)
λk+1 =
[
λk + αk
(
g(xk , uk , ξk)−∑Ni=1 v(i)k h(i)(u(i)k )
)]
+
, (12)
u(i)k+1 = u
(i)
k + αk(∂u(i) g(xk , uk)− v
(i)
k ∂u(i) h
(i)(u(i)k )) , (13)
v(i)k+1 = [v
(i)
k + αkλkh
(i)(u(i)k )]+ i = 1, . . . , N. (14)
where, ξk is assumed to be independent identically
distributed random process and αk is the adaptive
step-size in (9), and following assumptions are made
on f , g and h(i) s. Note that the weights x is updated
using the loss function information at randomly se-
lected image uξ , however the uncertain variable ui
corresponding to all the images are updated.
Assumption 3. We assume that f (x) is convex in x and
each h(i)(u(i)) is convex in u(i). Moreover, g(x, u, ξ) is
4
convex in x and is strictly concave in u for any fixed value
of ξ.
Remark 3. Clearly, the assumptions of strict convexity
of f and concavity of g are not satisfied in the DNN set-
ting. The strict convexity and strict concavity assump-
tions could be relaxed with weaker convergence results
than the one reported below. This is the topic of current
investigation.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 3 be satisfied and λ? >
0, then, following is true for the SSDS algorithm with
adaptive step-size αk satisfying (9).
lim
k→∞
E
ξk0
[xk ] = x? , lim
k→∞
E
ξk0
[uk ] = u? , where ξk0 = {ξ0, . . . , ξk}. (15)
Algorithm 1 Mini-batch SSDS algorithm
1: Input: ε, lr, p, C1, C2
2: Initialization: λ0, α0,w0, t0,u0, v0
3: for k ∈ {1, ..., K} do
4: distribute mini-batches as m = {m0, m1, .., mn}
5: w(m0)k = wk
6: λ(m0)k = λk
7: for mj ∈ {m0, m1, ..., mn} do
8: ∂wk = ∂wk ∑j∈mj L(I
(j) + u(j)k , y
(j) , w(j)k )
9: w
(m(j+1) )
k = w
(m(j) )
k − lr λk(∂wk )
10: end for
11: tk+1 = tk + αk(λk − 1)
12: v
(mj )
k+1 = v
(mj )
k + αk(‖u
(mj )
k ‖∞ − ε)
13: ∂uk = ∂uk L(I
(mj ) + u
(mj )
k , y
(mj ) , w
(mj )
k )
14: u
(mj )
k+1 = u
(mj )
k + αk(∂uk − C1 v
(mj )
k sign(u
(mj )
k ))
15: for j ∈ mj do
16: B(j) = (‖u(j)k ‖∞ − ε)
17: U(j) =
(
L(I(j) + u(j)k , y
(j) , w(j)k )− v(j)k
)
B(j)
18: end for
19: U = ∑j∈mj U
(j)
20: λ
(mj )
k+1 = λ
(mj )
k + C2 αk
(
U − tk
)
21: wk = w
(mn )
k
22: λk = λ
(mn )
k+1
23: αk+1 = αke−kp
24: end for
Mini-batch Implementation of SSDS Algorithm
In an attempt to use the proposed approach for
robust training of DNN, we propose a mini-batch
stochastic version of the SSDS in algorithm 1 to
achieve a more stable convergence. As stated above,
the SSDS algorithm involves the decision variable
x := (t, w), where ws are the parameters of DNN.
For simplicity of implementation, we first separate
the update rule for x, described in (11). In other
words, we split the updates of w and t that also en-
ables us to use standard learning rates (denoted by
lr) for the w updates. For the updates of t and other
SSDS variables, such as λ, u and v, we use a dimin-
ishing step-size αk. However, we refrain from apply-
ing the diminishing step-size described in (9) due to
the sheer complexity involved in taking the norm of
the parameters for a large-scale neural network. In-
stead, we use an exponentially decaying diminish-
ing step-size, αk+1 = αke−kp, where p is the decay
rate for exponentially diminishing stepsize and k is
the epoch number. Note that the updates of u and λ
can succumb to scaling issues depending of the val-
ues of the gradients and variable vk. Therefore, we
add two scaling factors C1 and C2 in the update rules
of u and λ to bring different terms of the update laws
to the same scale. Given a data set and a model ar-
chitecture, appropriate values can be found with a
few trial and error steps.Due to the separation of the
updates, another small departure in our implemen-
tation from the prescribed algorithm is - while w up-
dates are performed for every mini-batch (mj refers
to the jth mini-batch of kth epoch) , the other updates
are performed once every epoch. Also, in the orig-
inal formulation, we continuously update u corre-
sponding to all the images while the w is updated
using the gradient information of the loss function
evaluated at randomly selected images. In the al-
gorithm implementation however, u is also updated
only corresponding to the randomly selected images
based on which the network weights are updated.
This helps in reducing computation for large train-
ing sets.
Based on the above setup, the mini-batch SSDS algo-
rithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
We can also craft attacks based on the SSDS algo-
rithm. To do that, we run iterative updates of the
perturbations u given a test sample along with its
corresponding Lagrangian multiplier v, keeping the
model (w?) and λ∗ fixed. The attack algorithm is dis-
cussed in the supplementary material.
Experimental Results
Most robust learning papers consider only CIFAR-
10 and MNIST, where performances on MNIST data
sets are usually difficult to differentiate. We see
the same trend for MNIST as seen with CIFAR-10.
Therefore, We validate the proposed SSDS algorithm
empirically on the CIFAR-10 dataset Specifically, we
demonstrate the convergence characteristics of the
algorithm along with performance comparison with
benchmark techniques. We use the Resnet 50 15 and
VGG1924 model architectures and the software im-
plementation is done in Pytorch22. The codes will
be made available upon acceptance of the paper. The
key hyper-parameters of the proposed algorithm are
chosen as: lr = 0.001, ε = 0.03, p = 0.001, C1 =
C2 = 0.01. Through repeated trial and error, we find
the following suitable initializations: λ0 = 4, α0 = 2,
t0 = 0 and u0 = 0, v0 = 1, for all input images.
5
SSDS convergence characterisitcs
We begin this discussion with general training ac-
curacy and loss plots shown in Fig. 1 for mini-
batch SSDS algorithm for the CIFAR-10 dataset us-
ing VGG19 model architecture. The `∞-norm attack
budget was chosen to be 0.03 or 3% of the maximum
pixel intensity (comparable with previous works in
this area18,33). We also observe the accuracy values
for the clean test set during the training process. Ad-
ditionally, we plot the histogram of `∞-norms of fi-
nal perturbations added to the training images for a
few epochs during the training process (see Fig. 1c).
This is to verify the theoretical claim that the final
perturbations for the training images should con-
verge at or below the budget. From the empirical re-
sults shown in Fig. 1c, we make the observation that
although perturbations for some images spill over
the threshold value (0.03) during the course of the
training process, most of the perturbations converge
within the bound eventually (interestingly, a large
number of the perturbations settle below the thresh-
old).
Next, we focus on a specific training sample to un-
derstand how the dynamics for different variables in
the algorithm evolve during the course of the train-
ing process. A randomly chosen training image is
shown in Fig. 2a along with the corresponding fi-
nal perturbation generated by the algorithm and cor-
rupted adversarial version of the image. We observe
the dynamics of v over the training epochs. In this
experiment, v was initialized at 1 (for all of the im-
ages in the training set), and it converges to 0 after
around epoch 180. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 2c, `∞-
norm of the perturbation generated for the chosen
image converges to 0.026 which is below the speci-
fied budget. However, the actual perturbations for
individual pixels still continue to evolve even after
the `∞-norm for the entire perturbation matrix set-
tles down. To monitor the perturbations for the in-
dividual pixels, we plot `2 norm of the difference be-
tween the perturbations for two consecutive epochs.
We see that this metric finally converges to 0 around
epoch 300. At this point, the overall training process
also converges except for small changes due to the
stochastic nature of the training algorithm.
Model evaluation
We begin with performance comparison of SSDS-p
with PGD-training (trained with 20 PGD steps and
10 random starts18,33) and FGSM-training17 on var-
ious white-box attacks, such as FGSM, 20 step PGD
and SSDS-p attacks (see Table 1). We also keep the
Table 1 Defense method comparison under white-box attacks
(Resnet50 model architecture)
Attack Accuracy
Clean 84.75%
FGSM 40.48%
PGD 12.80%
SSDS-p 17.51%
(a) Natural training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 52.96 %
FGSM 70.12 %
PGD 9.61%
SSDS-p 10.83 %
(b) FGSM training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 45.52%
FGSM 61.81%
PGD 39.49%
SSDS-p 43.06%
(c) PGD training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 57.12%
FGSM 71.23%
PGD 46.11%
SSDS-p 55.55%
(d) SSDS-p training
record for naturally trained models as a baseline. We
present our results with two different model archi-
tectures: ResNet and VGG.
Resnet Model: Table 1 summarizes the results for
ResNet50 models under white-box attacks. We ob-
serve that SSDS-p training performs significantly
better than Natural training, FGSM-training and 20
step PGD training for all attacks. While outperform-
ing FGSM and PGD training for clean data, SSDS-p
still has considerably lower performance in compar-
ison with the natural model for clean images. How-
ever, this is a well-known observation for standard
ResNet models, which is typically addressed by us-
ing a wider model18.
Table 2 Black box table-model: Resnet50 without pretraining, Opti-
mizer=SGD, attack= 7-step PGD, ε = 3%
Target Source Accuracy
20-step PGD Naturally-trained 43.40%
SSDS-p Naturally-trained 51.11%
20-step PGD SSDS-p 42.18%
SSDS-p 20-step PGD 45.31%
Next, we evaluate our defense method for black box
attacks. We use our (SSDS-p) Resnet50 model for
defending against 7 step PGD attacks generated us-
ing a naturally trained model. From Table 2, we ob-
serve that our accuracy is significantly better com-
pared that of a 20 step-PGD model with the same
architecture. Then we perform a head-to-head com-
parison where we try to defend against 7 step PGD
attacks generated using a 20 step-PGD model with
SSDS-p training and vice-versa. The SSDS-p train-
ing performs better in this case as well (See Table 2).
We then extend our experiments to the running time
comparison between SSDS and PGD. Fig. 3 shows
that although PGD can acheive comparable acura-
cies with SSDS-p, the training time per epoch for
20 step PGD-training algorithm is approximately 16
times greater than that of the SSDS-p training algo-
rithm. On the other hand, SSDS-p training takes
around the same time as a 1 step PGD training. Note,
we do not compare our method with TRADES 32 as
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Figure 1 Results on CIFAR-10 dataset using VGG19 model: (a) Accuracy (b) Loss value (log scale) (c) ‖u‖∞ histogram
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Figure 2 Results on CIFAR-10 dataset using VGG19 model: (a) Example of SSDS training image(left), with its corruption(center) and the
corrupted image(right) (b) values of v for the above image (c) Evolution of ‖u‖∞ for the above image (d) Evolution of ‖uk − uk−1‖2 for the above
image
that algorithm is extremely similar to PGD training
(except for a new loss function for improved adver-
sarial accuracy) from a computational perspective.
Therefore, our approach still remains fundamentally
different and computationally significantly more ef-
ficient.
Figure 3 Training time per epoch for PGD vs. SSDS-p (Resnet50
model architecture)
VGG model: We now use a VGG19 model to eval-
uate our algorithm. While VGG19 training is com-
putationally less expensive compared to ResNet50,
SSDS-p training still remains significantly more effi-
cient compared to multi-step PGD training (see Fig 6
in Supplementary material). We observe that SSDS-
p training performs significantly better than FGSM-
training for all attacks (see Table 3). SSDS-p signif-
icantly outperforms 20 step PGD-training on clean
and FGSM corrupted images as well. Interestingly,
SSDS-p performance on clean data is very close to
that of natural training. However, PGD-training
works better for PGD corrupted images. On the
other hand, SSDS-p training performs better in clas-
sifying the SSDS-p corrupted images compared to
PGD-training. We also used our defense model to
defend against test cases generated by Madry et al.
18 models which are discussed in the Supplementary
material.
To further explore the trade-off between computa-
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Table 3 Defense method comparison under white-box attacks (VGG19
model architecture)
Attack Accuracy
Clean 86.10%
FGSM 53.70%
PGD 24.64%
SSDS-p 27.43%
(a) Natural training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 86.42 %
FGSM 54.92 %
PGD 23.10%
SSDS-p 30.97 %
(b) FGSM training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 69.11%
FGSM 45.42%
PGD 35.44%
SSDS-p 41.98%
(c) PGD training
Attack Accuracy
Clean 85.52%
FGSM 60.95 %
PGD 27.61%
SSDS-p 53.54 %
(d) SSDS-p training
tional cost and accuracy, we extend our experiments
to different computation and attack budgets. We
used different steps of PGD models to compare our
model with a less computationally expensive one. In
order to compare the performance of SSDS-p model
with k step PGD model for various k values, we train
different k step PGD models and test each of them
with their corresponding attack protocols, e.g., we
test a 5 step PGD model with 5 step PGD attack and
so on. As shown in Fig. 4a, we see that the SSDS-p
model outperforms k step PGD models until k = 5,
while being significantly better in terms of computa-
tion overhead. We also note that apart from training
time per epoch, SSDS-p usually converges in much
less number of epochs as compared to PGD train-
ing. Therefore, the total training time becomes even
shorter for SSDS-p. Finally, we consider the perfor-
mance of our model trained with `∞ budget of 0.03
under different attack budgets. In18, authors ob-
served that as the attack budget (ε) increases, the 20
step PGD model loses accuracy almost exponentially
for the CIFAR-10 data set. In contrast, SSDS-p model
accuracy saturates after 4%, eventually outperform-
ing PGD-training around ε = 8%. (see Fig. 4b)
(a) (b)
Figure 4 SSDS-p and PGD comparison (VGG model architecture):
(a) Performance comparison for PGD-k vs. SSDS, (b) Testing accu-
racy of 20-step PGD model vs. SSDS-p model with 3% budget on
20-step PGD corrupted images with different budgets
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new saddle-point dy-
namical systems approach to solve the robust learn-
ing problem. Under certain restrictive assumptions,
we present a detailed convergence analysis for the
stochastic version of our algorithm. Empirically, we
show that the proposed scheme is a computation-
ally inexpensive method that maintains a high level
of performance for clean and corrupted input data,
both for white-box and black-box attacks We believe
that this can be attributed to the fact that the adver-
sarial training in SSDS also acts as a form of regu-
larization. This notion is based on the equivalence
between the robust optimization problem and many
regularization problems26. Finally, we note that this
is an early attempt to adopting a dynamical systems
approach to robust learning. Therefore, future re-
search will focus on relaxing some of the restrictive
assumptions in the analysis for the loss function and
uncertainties. Similarly, we will focus on develop-
ing the SSDS algorithm further to better handle the
highly non-convex nature of deep network loss func-
tions, leading to a more competitive performance
with computationally intensive adversarial training
processes.
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Supplementary Material
Additional proofs and experimental results will be
discussed here; also more information about the ma-
terial in the main body of the paper will be added
here.
Additional Theorems and Derivations
We consider the following definitions in this section
x := (t, w), f (x) := t, g(x, u) := L(I + u, y, w)− t . (16)
Lagrangian function derivation
First, we derive the Lagrangian function in (4). The
lower level optimization problem in the RO prob-
lem (1) can be written as an optimization problem
parametrized by x such that
θ(x) := ∑Ni=1 max
u(i)∈U (i)
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)− t . (17)
Denote v(i) s as Lagrangian multipliers for the
lower level maximization problem and define v :=
[v1, . . . , vN ]>. The role of each v(i) multiplier is to
satisfy the uncertainty set constraint associated with
the perturbation u(i). Based on the Lagrangian the-
ory, one can equivalently write
θ(x) = ∑Ni=1 max
u(i)
min
v(i)≥0
(
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)
−v(i) h(i)(u(i)))− t . (18)
Hence,RO problem can be written as
RO = min
x=(w,t)
max
λ≥0
{
t +
λ
(
∑Ni=1 max
u(i)
min
v(i)≥0
(
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w) −
v(i) h(i)(u(i))
)− t) } (19)
= min
x=(w,t)
max
λ≥0
max
u(i)
min
v(i)≥0
{
t +
λ
(
∑Ni=1
(
L(I(i) + u(i) , y(i) , w)− v(i) h(i)(u(i)))− t) } .
Therefore, one can derive the total Lagrangian as in
(4).
Saddle and KKT point of the RO problem
The following theorem can be stated for the saddle
point of the optimization problem (1).
Theorem 5. Consider the Lagrangian function as de-
fined in (4). Under Assumption 1, following statements
are true for the optimization problem (1)
µ = min
x
max
λ≥0
max
u(i),∀i
min
v(i)≥0,∀i
L = min
x
min
vi≥0,∀i
max
λ≥0
max
u(i),∀i
L ,
µ = min
x,v(i),∀i
max
λ≥0,u(i),∀i
L = max
λ≥0,u(i),∀i
min
x,v(i),∀i
L ,
where x ∈ Rn,λ ≥ 0, u(i) ∈ Rm, and v(i) ≥ 0 for
i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, the Lagrangian function (4) has a
saddle point.
Proof. For the ease of notations, consider the RO
problem with single constraint and single uncer-
tainty set as
µ := min
x
f (x) s.t. max
h(u)≤0
g(x, u) ≤ 0 . (20)
The general case (1) with multiple uncertainty sets
can be proved along similar lines. The Lagrangian
for upper level problem in (20) is
f (x) + λ
(
max
h(u)≤0
g(x, u)
)
.
We can write the total Lagrangian for (20) as
L(x, v,λ, u) = f (x) + λ (g(x, u)− vh(u)) .
Hence, we can write
µ = min
x
max
λ≥0
max
u
min
v≥0
L(x, v,λ, u)
= min
x
max
λ≥0
max
u
min
v≥0
(
f (x) + λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)))
= min
x
(
f (x) +max
λ≥0
max
u
min
v≥0
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u))) .
We now show that
µ = min
x
min
v≥0
max
λ≥0
max
u
L(x, v,λ, u) ,
noting the switch in the sequence of min-max. It is
sufficient to show that for any x,
γ := max
λ≥0
max
u
min
v≥0
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) = min
v≥0
max
λ≥0
max
u
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) .
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Let
G(x) := max
h(u)≤0
g(x, u) = max
u
min
v≥0
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) .
(21)
So,
γ = max
λ≥0
G(x) =
{
0 G(x) ≤ 0
∞ G(x) > 0 . (22)
From strong duality for the parametric optimization
problem (21), we have
G(x) = min
v≥0
max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) .
Now, consider the second part in (9), that is
min
v≥0
max
λ≥0
max
u
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) .
Starting from the first max
u
at right, we get
max
u
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) ={
0 λ = 0
max
u
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) λ > 0, v ≥ 0 (23)
Then, consider max
λ≥0
as
max
λ≥0
{
0 λ = 0
max
u
λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)) λ > 0, v ≥ 0 =
∞ v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) > 0
0 v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) = 0
0 v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) < 0
.
Lastly, consider min
v≥0
as
min
v≥0

∞ v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) > 0
0 v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) = 0
0 v ≥ 0, max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u)) < 0
=
 ∞ minv≥0 maxu (g(x, u)− vh(u)) > 00 min
v≥0
max
u
(g(x, u)− vh(u) ≤ 0 ,
which is equal to γ as claimed in (22). Since mini-
mizations (maximizations) can always be combined,
the above result shows that
µ = min
x,v≥0
max
λ≥0,u
L(x, v,λ, u) .
Note that L is (jointly) convex in (x, v), but it is not
(jointly) concave in (λ, u); although it is concave in
each of these variables. We next show that notwith-
standing this issue, the optimal solution to µ is a sad-
dle point. Specifically, we show that
µ = min
x,v≥0
max
λ≥0,u
L(x, v,λ, u) = max
λ≥0,u
min
x,v≥0
L(x, v,λ, u) .
(24)
To show this, note that strong duality in the upper
level parametric optimization problem in (20) im-
plies
µ = min
x
max
λ≥0
( f (x) + λG(x)) = max
λ≥0
min
x
( f (x) + λ G(x))
= max
λ≥0
min
x
max
u
min
v≥0
( f (x) + λ(g(x, u)− vh(u))) ,
where the last equality comes from the definition of
G(x) in (21). To obtain the result in (24), we need to
show that for any λ ≥ 0 ,
η = min
x
max
u
min
v≥0
( f (x) + λ(g(x, u)− vh(u)))
= max
u
min
x
min
v≥0
( f (x) + λ(g(x, u)− vh(u))) .
Note that
min
v≥0
(−vλh(u)) =
{
0 λh(u) ≤ 0
−∞ λh(u) > 0 .
So, we have
max
u
( f (x) + λg(x, u) +
{
0 λh(u) ≤ 0
−∞ λh(u) > 0 )
= f (x) + max
λh(u)≤0
λg(x, u) .
Thus,
η = min
x
max
λh(u)≤0
( f (x) + λg(x, u)) .
Since g(x, u) is convex in x and concave in u as for
Assumption 1, so f (x)+λg(x, u) has the same prop-
erties for λ ≥ 0. It follows that the result does not
change if we swap the order of the optimizations.
Hence,
η = min
x
max
λh(u)≤0
( f (x) + λg(x, u))
= max
λh(u)≤0
min
x
( f (x) + λg(x, u))
= max
u
min
x
min
v≥0
( f (x) + λg(x, u)− vh(u)) ,
which completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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Let z? = (x?,λ?, u?, v?) be the saddle point for
the Lagrangian (4). Using the result of Theorem 5,
it follows that z? enjoys the saddle point property,
namely
L(x?,λ, u, v?) ≤ L(x?,λ?, u?, v?) ≤ L(x,λ?, u?, v) .
(25)
From the above discussion on the development of
Lagrangian function L, it follows that RO problem
can be viewed as two connected optimization prob-
lems. The lower level optimization problem (17) pa-
rameterized by x involving maximization over un-
certain variables u(i) s and the upper level optimiza-
tion problem involving minimization over the deci-
sion variable x. This insight can be used to define the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the RO
problem as follows.
Definition 1. Recalling that x = (w, t), the KKT point
(x?,λ?, u?, v?) for theRO problem (1) can be defined as
follows
∂xL(x?,λ?, u?, v?) = 0 ,
∂u(i)L(i)(x?, u(i)?, v(i)?) = 0 , (26)
λ? ≥ 0,
λ?
(
L(I(i) + u(i)?, y(i), w?)−
t? − v(i)? h(i)(u(i)?)) = 0 , (27)
v(i)? ≥ 0,
v(i)? h(i)(u(i)?) = 0 , (28)
L(I(i) + u(i)?, y(i), w?)−
t? − v(i)? h(i)(u(i)?) ≤ 0 ,
h(i)(u(i)?) ≤ 0 , (29)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where ∂x f is the notation for
the gradient of f w.r.t. x, L defined in (4),
and L(i)(x, u(i), v(i)) := L(I(i) + u(i), y(i), w) −
v(i) h(i)(u(i)) for i = 1 . . . , N.
We now propose the following fundamental theo-
rem on establishing the connection between the KKT
and saddle point of theRO problem.
Theorem 6. The KKT point (x?,λ?, u?, v?) satisfying
conditions (26)-(29) also satisfies saddle point inequalities
in (25) and vice versa.
Proof. Considering the definitions in (16), we first
show that the KKT point satisfies the saddle point
property. Note that
L(x?,λ?, u?, v?)−L(x?,λ, u, v?)
= λ?(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)) −
λ(g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)))
= (λ? + λ− λ)(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)) −
λ(g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)))
= λ(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)) −
λ(g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i))) +
(λ? − λ)(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)) .
Since u? is maximizing g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)),
we have
(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?))−
(g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i))) ≥ 0 .
By complimentary slackness property of the KKT
point, we get λ?(g(x?, u?) − ∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)) =
0 and g(x?, u?) ≤ 0. Combining all these implies
L(x?,λ?, u?, v?)−L(x?,λ, u, v?) ≥ 0 .
We next show that L(x,λ?, u?, v)− L(x?,λ?, u?, v?)
is non-negative. Note that
L(x,λ?, u?, v)−L(x?,λ?, u?, v?)
= f (x)− f (x?) + λ?(g(x, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)h(i)(u(i)?) −
λ?(g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?)))
= f (x)− f (x?) + λ?(g(x, u?)− g(x?, u?)) +
N
∑
i=1
λ?(v(i)
? − v(i))h(i)(u(i)?) .
Since (x?, v?) minimizes the Lagrangian, we have
f (x)− f (x?) + λ?(g(x, u?)− g(x?, u?)) ≥ 0 .
Similarly, using complimentary slackness condition
and the fact that h(i)(u(i)?) ≤ 0, v(i) ≥ 0, and λ? ≥ 0,
it follows that ∑Ni=1 λ
?(v(i)? − v(i))h(i)(u(i)?) ≥ 0 .
Now, we show that saddle point satisfies KKT con-
ditions. Note that
min
x,v
L(x,λ?, u?, v) = L(x?,λ?, u?, v?) ≤ L(x,λ?, u?, v),
max
u,λ
L(x?,λ, u, v?) = L(x?,λ?, u?, v?) ≥ L(x?,λ, u, v?) .
Hence,
∂x f (x?) + λ?∂xg(x?, u?) = 0 ,
∂u(i)g(x
?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?∂u(i)h(i)(u(i)?) = 0 .
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To show complimentary slackness, consider the op-
timization problem with fixed x = x? as
max
u(i),∀i
g(x?, u) s.t. h(i)(u(i)) ≤ 0 , i = 1, . . . , N .
With g concave in u and each h(i) convex in u(i),
the above problem is convex with zero duality gap
and hence, based on convex optimization theory7,
we have
g(x?, u?) = G(x?, v?)
= max
u(i),∀i
(
g(x?, u)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i))
)
≥ g(x?, u?)−∑Ni=1 v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?) ≥ g(x?, u?) .
The first inequality is true because h(i)(u(i)?) ≤ 0
and v(i)? ≥ 0. Hence, from the last inequality we get
v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?) = 0. We next show that λ?g(x?, u?) =
0. For fixed u?, consider the optimization problem
min
x
f (x) s.t. g(x, u?) ≤ 0 .
For fixed u?, above is a convex optimization problem
and hence, we have zero duality gap. Then similarly,
f (x?) = F(λ?, u?) = inf
x
f (x) + λ?g(x, u?)
≤ f (x?) + λ?g(x?, u?) ≤ f (x?) .
The first inequality is true because g(x?, u?) ≤ 0, and
hence, the last inequality implies λ?g(x?, u?) = 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
We can specify the equilibrium point (x?,λ?, u?, v?)
of the dynamical system (11)-(14) as
∂x f (x?) + λ?∂xg(x?, u?, ξ) = 0,
∂u(i)g(x
?, u?, ξ)− v(i)?∂u(i)h(i)(u(i)?) = 0 ,
λ?g(x?, u?, ξ) = 0,
λ? ≥ 0,
g(x?,λ?, ξ) ≤ 0,
λ?v(i)?h(i)(u(i)?) = 0,
v(i)? ≥ 0,
h(i)(u(i)?) ≤ 0.
for i = 1, . . . , N. The above conditions can also
be viewed as the generalization of the KKT con-
ditions from the deterministic setting to stochastic
setting. Furthermore, by defining the Lagrangian
function, L(x,λ, u, v, ξ) := f (x) + λ(g(x, u, ξ) −
∑Ni=1 v
(i)h(i)(u(i))), following generalization of sad-
dle point condition from deterministic setting (25) to
stochastic setting can be considered
L(x?,λ, u, v?, ξ) ≤ L(x?,λ?, u?, v?, ξ) ≤ L(x,λ?, u?, v, ξ) .
(30)
Convergence Proof of Stochastic Version of the Algo-
rithm
For the convergence proof of SSDS algorithm in (11)-
(14), we will assume λ? > 0 and that numbers R and
Rλ ≤ R are known satisfying
‖z1‖2 ≤ R, ‖z?‖2 ≤ R, ‖λ?‖2 ≤ Rλ .
We will also assume that the norm of the subgradi-
ents of f , g and h(i) s, and the values of f , g and h(i) s
are bounded on compact sets based on Assumption
1. Let us start by defining the compact notations
N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22) := ‖xk+1 − x?‖22 + ‖λk+1 − λ?‖22
+λ?‖uk+1 − u?‖22 + ‖vk+1 − v?‖22 ,
(zk+1 − z?)λ? := (xk+1 − x?) + (λk+1 − λ?)
+λ?(uk+1 − u?) + (vk+1 − v?) ,
‖T‖22,λ? := ‖T(x)‖22 + ‖T(λ)‖22
+λ?‖T(u)‖22 + ‖T(v)‖22 .
By using the non-expansive property of positive pro-
jection operations for λ and v iterations, we write out
the following basic equations
Eξk [N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)]
= Eξk [‖xk − αk(∂x f (xk, ξk) + λk∂xg(xk, uk, ξk)− x?‖22]
+ Eξk [‖[λk + αkg(xk, uk, ξk)− vkh(uk)]+ − λ?‖22]
+ Eξk [λ
?‖uk + αk(∂ug(xk, uk, ξk)− vk∂uh(uk)− u?‖22]
+ Eξk [‖[vk + αk(λkh(uk))]+ − v?‖22]
≤ Eξk [‖xk − x? − αk(∂x f (xk, ξk) + λk∂xg(xk, uk, ξk))‖22]
+ Eξk [‖λk − λ? + αk(g(xk, uk, ξk)− vkh(uk))‖22]
+ Eξkλ
?‖uk − u? + αk(∂ug(xk, uk, ξk)− vk∂uh(uk))‖22]
+ Eξk [‖vk − v? + αk(λkh(uk))‖22]
= ‖xk − x?‖22 + ‖λk − λ?‖22 + λ?‖uk − u?‖22 + ‖vk − v?‖22
− 2Eξk [αk(∂x f (xk, ξk) + λk∂xg(xk, uk, ξk))>(xk − x?)]
+ 2Eξk [αk(g(xk, uk, ξk)− vkh(uk))>(λk − λ?)]
+ 2Eξk [αkλ
?(∂ug(xk, uk, ξk)− vk∂uh(uk))>(uk − u?)]
+ Eξk [2αk(λkh(uk))
>(vk − v?)]
+ Eξk [(αk)
2‖∂x f (xk, ξk) + λk∂xg(xk, uk, ξk)‖22]
+ Eξk [(αk)
2‖g(xk, uk, ξk)− vkh(uk)‖22]
+ Eξk [(αk)
2λ?‖∂ug(xk, uk, ξk)− vk∂uh(uk)‖22]
+ Eξk [(αk)
2‖λkh(uk)‖22] .
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Using the compact notation, this reads to be
Eξk [N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ N (‖zk − z?‖22)
− 2Eξk [αkT>k N (zk+1 − z?)] + Eξk [α2k ‖Tk‖22,λ? ] .
Considering the upper bound Rλ for two-norm of
λ?, we can write
Eξk [N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ N (‖zk − z?‖22)
− 2Eξk [αkT>k N (zk+1 − z?)] + C γ2k .
Taking expectation on both the sides with respect to
E
ξk−10
on both the sides and using the fact that ξk−10 is
independent of ξk, we obtain
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ Eξk−10 N (‖zk − z
?‖22)
− 2Eξk0 [αkT
>
k N (zk+1 − z?)] + C γ2k ,
E
ξk−10
[N (‖zk − z?‖22)] ≤ Eξk−20 N (‖zk−1 − z
?‖22)
(31)
− 2E
ξk−10
[αk−1T>k−1N (zk − z?)] + C γ2k−1, (32)
where C is defined as max{1, Rλ}. Substituting in-
equality (9) into (8) we obtain
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ Eξk−20 N (‖zk−1 − z
?‖22)
− 2E
ξk−10
[αk−1T>k−1N (zk − z?)]
− 2Eξk0 [αkT
>
k N (zk+1 − z?)]
+ C(γ2k + γ
2
k−1) .
Using recursion, we obtain
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ Eξ0N (‖z1 − z?‖22)
− 2
k
∑
i=1
Eξ i0 [α
(i)T(i)>N (zi+1 − z?)] + C
k
∑
i=1
γ(i)
2
,
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)]
+ 2
k
∑
i=1
Eξ i0 [α
(i)T(i)>N (zi+1 − z?)]
≤ Eξ0N (‖z1 − z?‖22) + C
k
∑
i=1
γ(i)
2 ≤ C(4R2 + S)
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] + 2
(
Eξ10 [α1T
>
1 N (z2 − z?)]
+ Eξ20 [α2T
>
2 N (z3 − z?)] + . . .
+ Eξk0
[αkT>k N (zk+1 − z?)]
)
≤ Eξ0N (‖z1 − z?‖22)
+ C
k
∑
i=1
γ(i)
2 ≤ C(4R2 + S) , (33)
where the last inequality comes from the bounds on
‖z1‖2, ‖z?‖2, ‖λ?‖2 and ∑∞k=1(γk)2.
We argue that the sum on the left-hand side of (33)
is non-negative.
Eξk0
[αkT>k N (zk+1 − z?)] = Eξk−10 [[Eξk [αkT
>
k N (zk+1 − z?)]]]
Where we have use the fact that ξk−10 is independent
of ξk.
Eξk [αkT
>
k N (zk+1 − z?)]
= Eξk [αk∂x f (xk, ξk) + αkλk∂xg(xk, uk, ξk)
>(xk − x?)]
− Eξk [αk(g(xk, uk, ξk)− vkh(uk))>(λk − λ?)]
− Eξk [αkλ?(∂ug(xk, uk, ξk)− vk∂uh(uk))>(uk − u?)]
+ Eξk [−αkλkh(uk)>(vk − v?)]
≥ Eξk [αk( f (xk, ξk)− f (x?, ξk))] + Eξk [((((((
(
αkλkg(xk, uk, ξk)
− αkλkg(x?, uk, ξk)]− Eξk [((((((
(
αkλkg(xk, uk, ξk)
+((((
((((αkλ
?g(xk, uk, ξk)] + Eξk [(((
(((αkλkvkh(uk)−((((((αkλ?vkh(uk)]
+ Eξk [αkλ
?g(xk, u?, ξk)−((((((
((
αkλ
?g(xk, uk, ξk)]
+ Eξk [(((
(((αkλ
?vkh(uk)]− Eξk [αkλ?vkh(u?)−(((((
(
αkλkvkh(uk)
+ αkλkv?h(uk)]
= Eξk [αk(
(
f (xk, ξk) + λ?g(xk, u?, ξk)− λ?vkh(u?)
)
]
− Eξk [αk
(
f (x?, ξk) + λkg(x?, uk, ξk)− λkv?h(uk)
)
]
= Eξk [αkL(xk,λ?, u?, vk, ξk)]− Eξk [αkL(x?,λk, uk, v?, ξk)]
≥ Eξk [αkL(xk,λ?, u?, vk, ξk)− αkL(x?,λ?, u?, v?, ξk)] ≥ 0 .
Since αk ≥ 0, we have from above that
Eξk0
[αkT>k N (zk+1 − z?)] ≥ 0
Remark 4. Since f is assumed to be strictly convex in x
and g is strictly concave in u, the above inequality is strict
whenever x 6= x? and u 6= u?. Moreover, if the inequality
becomes an equality, we get x = x? and u = u?.
We have
Eξk0
[N (‖zk+1 − z?‖22)] ≤ C(4R2 + S),
2
k
∑
i=1
γ(i)Eξ i0
[
T(i)>
‖T(i)‖ (z
(i) − z?)λ?
]
≤ C(4R2 + S)
By assumption, the norm of Subgradients on the set
‖zk‖2,λ? ≤ D is bounded, so it follows that ‖Tk‖2 is
bounded. Because the sum of γk diverges, for the
sum
k
∑
i=1
γ(i)Eξ i0
[
T(i)
>
‖T(i)‖ (zi+1 − z
?)λ?
]
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to be bounded, we need
lim
k→∞
Eξk0
[
T>k
‖Tk‖2N (zk+1 − z
?)
]
= 0.
Since ‖Tk‖2 is bounded, the numerator
Eξk0
[T>k N (zk+1 − z?)] has to go to zero in the
limit. From Remark 4, we conclude that
lim
k→∞
E
ξk−10
[xk] = x?, lim
k→∞
E
ξk−10
[uk] = u?.
Experimental Results
In this section, more elaborations about SSDS algo-
rithm will be provided, and different experiments
using SSDS-p algorithm will be discussed.
SSDS-p Model Convergence Results
As discussed in the main paper, although SSDS can
control the perturbations to remain under the bud-
get for most of the data points, we add a projection
term for the u update in order to make sure that
we are always perturbing within the budget. Fig. 5
shows the accuracy and loss value plots for SSDS-p
training. Also, as shown in Fig. 7, for SSDS-p algo-
rithm ‖u‖∞ never goes beyond the budget and the
`∞ norm of the final perturbations stays at the speci-
fied budget (0.03 here) for the majority of the images
in the dataset (see Fig. 5c). Similar to the observation
we made for SSDS case, v converges shortly after the
evolution starts (at epoch 180 here), but the dynam-
ics for finding the desired attack, ‖uk − uK−1‖2 con-
verges to zero later (epoch 250 here). Fig. 7a shows
how the natural image, final attack, and the final cor-
rupted image look like.
SSDS and SSDS-p attacks
As discussed in Section 1, SSDS attacks are found
through an iterative process by freezing the model
(w?) and λ? and using the update rules for u and
v. Therefore, we follow the steps discussed in algo-
rithm 2 for SSDS attacks. The notion holds for SSDS-
p attacks except for the projection term which keeps
the attacks within the budget at all times.
Fig. 8 shows the performance of the different mod-
els i.e., SSDS-p, PGD, FGSM, and naturally trained
models on SSDS-p attacks. The final values are re-
ported in Table 1, and as the plots are showing, the
accuracy is high in the beginning when the algo-
rithm hasn’t still converged and the final perturba-
tion is still not found, but as the final perturbation
Algorithm 2 SSDS attack algorithm
1: Input: ε, p, C1, w?
2: Initialization:u0, v0, α0
3: for k ∈ {1, ..., K} do
4: v
(mj)
k+1 = v
(mj)
k + αk(‖u
(mj)
k ‖∞ − ε)
5: u
(mj)
k+1 = u
(mj)
k + αk(∂uk L(I
(mj) +
u
(mj)
k , y
(mj), w?)− C1 v(mj)k sign(u
(mj)
k ))
6: αk+1 = αke−kp
7: end for
is found, the accuracy stays fixed at the testing accu-
racy of the corresponding model on SSDS-p attack.
Fig. 9 shows the visual differences between
these three attacks on a randomly selected image.
The clean image(left), the corresponding corrup-
tion(center) and the corrupted image (right) are pro-
vided for each method. Figs. 9b and 9a show
that the notion of imperceptibility holds for SSDS
and PGD attacks, where as FGSM perturbations are
much less imperceptible.
Evolution of the attacks
Based on what we discussed in previous chapters,
the SSDS algorithm goes through an iterative pro-
cess for finding the adversary. Therefore, the at-
tack pattern evolves significantly as the algorithm
progresses. As shown in Fig. 10, the attack pattern
changes until the final attack is found, and then it re-
mains almost the same after the algorithm converges
(here at epoch 260).
VGG model evaluation Under transfer attacks:
We note that for all the white-box results presented
in Table 3, we use a VGG19 15 model architecture
with the same set of hyper-parameters. However,
Madry et al. 18 used a wide Resnet model31 trained
with a very large number of epochs (80000 epochs)
to achieve the state-of-the-art robust models. There-
fore, we also tested our SSDS-p robust model on
the corrupt test cases generated by Madry et al. In
this regard, the accuracy values reported in the first
3 columns of Table 4 are directly borrowed from18.
Our SSDS-p trained model (still a VGG-19 model)
demonstrates a strong performance on these bench-
mark data sets. However, these attacks are transfer
attacks for the SSDS-p model while they are white
box attacks for the other models listed here. There-
fore, SSDS-p model is expected to perform slightly
better in these cases21. More interestingly, we find
that the SSDS-p model performs significantly better
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Figure 5 Results for training CIFAR-10 dataset using SSDS-p algorithm, VGG19 model architecture: (a) Accuracy (b) Loss value (log scale)
(c)Histogram of ‖u‖∞
Figure 6 Training time per epoch for PGD vs. SSDS-p (VGG19 model architecture)
than the wide PGD model in a pure black-box set-
ting. While the wide PGD model has a black-box
accuracy of 64.2% under a 7 step PGD attack as re-
ported in18, SSDS-p has an accuracy of 69.58%. Note
that the model used in this experiment is trained for
longer time (3000 epochs) whereas the model used
in white-box evaluation experiment ( Table 3) is
trained for 1000 epochs. Therefore, the test accuracy
of SSDS-P model on clean images is slightly higher
compared to the same accuracy reported in Table 3.
Table 4 Performance of different models on Madry et al. 18 generated
test cases
Attack
Model Natural training FGSM training PGD training SSDS-p
Clean 92.70% 87.40% 79.04% 86.83%
FGSM 27.5% 90.09% 51.70% 70.55%
PGD 0.80% 0.00% 43.70% 67.52%
Training time comparison for VGG model architecture
Similar to what we did for the Resnet50 model, We
compare the running time for SSDS-p and k-step
PGD for our VGG19 model. Fig. 6 shows that the
training time per epoch for 20 step PGD-training al-
gorithm is approximately 7 times greater than that of
the SSDS-p training algorithm. On the other hand,
SSDS-p training takes around the same time as a 2
step PGD training.
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Figure 7 Results for training CIFAR-10 dataset, SSDS-p algorithm, VGG19 model architecture:(a) Example of SSDS-p training image(left),
with its corruption(center) and the corrupted image(right), (b) v values for the above image (c) ‖u‖∞ for the above image, (d)|uk − uK−1‖2 for
the above image
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(a) SSDS-p model (b) PGD model
(c) FGSM model (d) Natural model
Figure 8 Accuracy plots of different models on SSDS-p attacked images with ε = 0.03 budget
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(a) SSDS Attack
(b) PGD attack
(c) FGSM attack
Figure 9 Different attack model visualizations
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Figure 10 SSDS attack evolution
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